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Abstract:  
 
Fishing capacity management policies have been traditionally implemented at national level with 
national targets for capacity reduction. More recently, capacity management policies have increasingly 
targeted specific fisheries. French fisheries spatially vary along the French coastline and are 
associated to specific regions. Capacity management policies however ignore the capital mobility 
associated with second-hand vessel trade between regions. This is not an issue for national policies 
but could limit the effectiveness of regional capacity management policies. A gravity model and a 
random-effect Poisson regression model are used to analyse the determinants and spatial extent of 
the second-hand market in France. This study is based on panel data from the French Atlantic Ocean 
between 1992 and 2009. The trade flows between trading partners is found to increase with their sizes 
and to be spatially concentrated. Despite the low trade flows between regions, a net impact analysis 
shows that fishing capacity is redistributed by the second-hand market to regions on the Channel and 
Aquitaine from central regions. National capacity management policies (constructions/destructions) 
have induced a net decrease in regional fleet capacity with varying magnitude across regions. Unless 
there is a change of policy instruments or their scale of implementation, the operation of the second-
hand market decreases the effectiveness of regional capacity management policies in regions on the 
Channel and Aquitaine. 
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1. Introduction 
Fishing capacity in the European Union is managed at country-level within the framework of the 
Common Fishery Policy (CFP). The CFP has aimed since 1983 to reduce fleet (over)capacity and 
adjust fleet capacity to available fishing resources in each Member State (European Commission 
2008). National capacity reductions achieved under these policies have had a limited impact on 
overfishing reduction and the media have regularly outlined the failure to manage fisheries 
sustainably (e.g. Mediterranean Bluefin Tuna, North Sea Cod). Governments have therefore been 
under increased pressure to re-design and implement management policies to reduce overfishing 
more effectively. European capacity management policies rely on two main policy instruments: 
entry restrictions (access licences 1) and decommissioning subsidies. Since 2003, eligibility for 
national policies has been based on specific fish stocks and/or fishing areas and/or associated fleet 
segments criteria. Vessels are eligible for national capacity management policies regardless of their 
region of registration and fishing area. However, because of the distribution of fisheries along the 
French coastline, eligible fishing segments are distributed heterogeneously along the coastline 
(Berthou et al. 2002; Leblond et al. 2007, p15-24; Leblond et al. 2011, p13-22; Van Iseghem et al. 
2011, Figure 3 p1797). All regions do not have equal access to these fishery specific policies and 
associated subsidies, and fishery specific policies are therefore also region specific.  
 
Historically, French capacity management policies have targeted the place of administrative 
registration of the vessel rather than the actual fishing or landing areas. There are no legal 
constraints binding these areas together (Guyader et al. 2007). They are however strongly linked 
together in France. Ifremer's summary statistics reports consistently show that since 1996 most 
                                                
1 Complementary licences have been introduced on a piecemeal basis at the regional or local (sub-regional) level to 
limit entry for specific fisheries and related fish stocks. These fishery licenses are operated by the fishing industry with 
limited involvement of the government so far. A more detailed description of how the fishing licences are operated in 
France can be found in MRAG et al. (2009, Part 2 Section 10, p106-133) and Larabi et al. (unpubl.). 
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vessels in the French fleet are small (less than 12m long), have 1 or 2 gears, practise 1 to 3 métiers 2 
and fish close to the coast (Berthou et al. 2002; Leblond et al. 2007, p15-24; Leblond et al. 2011, 
p13-22). Several fish segments can fish the same fish stock but with varying catch or gross margins 
(Daurès et al. 2007). Fuel costs represent a large part of the fishing variable costs and vessel owners 
tend to register and operate their vessels close to where they live. All vessels along the coastline are 
subject to the same national-level legislation and have access to equivalent decentralised 
administrative services. Because of their link to specific fishing areas, places of administrative 
registration provide a pragmatic spatial basis for fishery policy assessment in France. 
 
Capacity management policies have led to a decrease in overall fleet numbers and a higher 
proportion of the fleet being traded on the second-hand market for higher prices (Quillérou et al. 
2011). The second-hand market is important for entry into the fishing sector for first-time capital-
constrained buyers (van Putten et al. 2012). Capacity management policies have increased the role 
of the second-hand vessel market for fisher's entry into the fishing industry (Guyader et al. 2006; 
Quillérou et al. 2011, p20). Access and fishery licences are legally bound to a vessel. Trading a 
vessel necessarily includes trade of both the vessel and its access and fishery licences. Since 2006, 
owners have been allowed to sell their vessel whilst keeping their quota track records. Preliminary 
evidence would seem to suggest that the second-hand vessel trade has not been impacted much so 
far and this is still in transition (Larabi et al., unpubl.). 
 
At the national level, these capacity management policies have led to a net decrease in vessel 
numbers and power (Lindebo 2005; Quillérou et al. 2011, p12; Quillérou and Guyader 2012). The 
                                                
2 A métier is a homogeneous subdivision of a fishery by vessel type (ICES 2003, p2). The concept has recently been 
more specifically defined for the European Union as “a group of fishing operations targeting a similar (assemblage of) 
species, using similar gear, during the same period of the year and/or within the same area and which are characterised 
by a similar exploitation pattern” (European Commission Decision 2010/93/EU, Annex I Chapter 1, p9). Identification 
of different metiers is however not always straightforward in practice (Marchal 2008; Deporte et al. 2012). 
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national reductions in fleet capacity are however generally not equal across regions (Villasante 
2010). There are two possible reasons for this: firstly the number of vessels constructed and 
decommissioned varies across regions and secondly the second-hand market redistributes the 
national fleet capacity between lower geographical levels. 
 
In theory, the second-hand market acts as an efficient mechanism for capital redistribution from 
registration districts close to over-utilised/less profitable fisheries to districts close to under-
utilised/more profitable fisheries. This capital redistribution along the French coastline through the 
second-hand market is compatible with national-level (non fishery specific) policy. The second-
hand market trade acts as an internal redistribution mechanism as access licences do not restrict 
access between fisheries. Trade of second-hand vessels will occur depending on differences in 
fishing rents. For regional (fishery specific) policies however, the unrestricted redistribution of 
capital along the coastline between regions becomes an external pressure on regional capacity 
management. 
 
Whereas before policy assessment against national targets has been undertaken at the national level, 
the adoption of more regionally focused fishery specific policies would require a shift to regional-
level assessments against regional targets. This regional fishery focus for capacity management 
policies so far ignores capacity redistribution through the second-hand market between regions. If 
left free to operate between regions, second-hand market redistribution could undermine the 
effectiveness of regional policies. 
 
There exists some knowledge on how fisher behaviour impacts capacity redistribution between 
fishing areas. Opaluch et al. (1984) showed that an individual fisherman reallocates its fishing effort 
between fisheries depending on economic incentives such as expected returns from the new 
location. They also showed that the high switching costs imposed by changing fisheries (imperfect 
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malleability) tend to limit this effort reallocation and that fishermen tend to stay within the same 
fishery over time. Because of the strong link between fisheries and places of registration in France, 
a long term-change of fishery would be associated to a change of place of registration. This change 
would also be generally associated to the owner moving homes closer to its vessel, or most likely a 
change of owners with the new owner living close to the new place of registration. 
 
There is however little information available on capacity dynamics through changes of owners, 
including on the spatial extent of capacity redistribution (Fulton et al. 2011; van Putten et al. 2011). 
A previous description showed that 40-50% of traded vessels change maritime districts and 25-40% 
change regions through the operation of the second-hand-market in the French Atlantic Ocean 
(Quillérou et al. 2011, p30-31). Maritime districts in France are bundles of fishing harbours within a 
given region and constitute the administrative level for vessel registration. Maritime districts also 
provide the lowest spatial level for assessment of capacity management policies and allow for 
aggregation at the regional level. They also tend to be relatively specialised with one fishing 
segment more present than the others (Berthou et al. 2002; Leblond et al. 2007, p15-24; Leblond et 
al. 2011, p13-22; Van Iseghem et al. 2011, Figure 3 p1797). 
 
Our study addresses this gap by focusing on trade of fishing capacity between two specific places of 
registration. We also examine consequences of the shift in spatial policy scale from the national 
level to the regional level on the policy effectiveness because of the operation of the second-hand 
vessel market. 
 
Several proxies of vessel capacity can be used, e.g. vessel numbers, power, tonnage or investment. 
In this paper, we consider vessel numbers as a proxy for capacity and follow the same approach as 
in Quillérou and Guyader (2012). Vessel numbers do not constitute a perfect proxy for capacity and 
other measures of capacity or combination of measures should be ideally preferred. Bigger vessels 
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tend to have greater capacity than smaller vessels so each vessel (unit) does not represent an equal 
amount of capacity. Also, (subsidised) fishing vessels modernisation contributes to maintaining 
fleet overcapacity (Villasante and Sumaila 2010). A reduction in the number of vessels does 
therefore not necessarily mean less real fishing effort (Del Valle Erkiaga and Ikazuriaga 2012). 
 
Vessel numbers provide a proxy for total fleet capacity (typically targeted by capacity management 
policies) but not actually used fleet capacity. Total fleet capacity is constrained by fleet 
(non)renewal through constructions/destructions of vessels and represents the capacity of a fully 
utilised fleet. Actually used fleet capacity is constrained by both constructions/destructions and fleet 
activity. Total and actually used fleet capacities have been very different in the French Atlantic 
Ocean. Both fleet activity and constructions/destructions have affected overall fleet numbers in 
1994-2008 with similar magnitudes (Quillérou et al. 2011, p14; Quillérou and Guyader 2012). In 
2009, about 5% of the French Atlantic Ocean fleet vessels were classified as "inactive" (not used 
for fishing). 
 
Despite these limitations, and for the same reasons as outlined in Quillérou and Guyader (2012), 
vessel number is the only available unit of capacity that has been consistently recorded over the 
entire study period. There is no available consistent measurement of tonnage available across the 
whole time period for this analysis: the new GT unit is not comparable to the previous one, the 
change in measurement occurred over an unidentified period of time and there is no discrimination 
between measures in the data records. Also, records of vessel fishing power in the European fleet 
register have been shown to be inaccurate (Guyader et al. 2007). Our approach is however not 
limited to the use of vessel numbers and other measures of capacity such as power or tonnage could 
be used instead when available. 
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Our first research objective is to assess whether the second-hand market reallocates capacity 
between regions. We investigate what drives second-hand trade flows along the coastline and their 
spatial extent. We use a gravity model of trade flows of second-hand vessels between fishing 
districts. Distance between districts and spatial dummies have been explicitly included to identify 
the distance decay effect of trade between districts and regions. We use additional original fishery 
data to extend the gravity model estimation. We estimate this model using a random-effect Poisson 
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood econometric model to keep both time-varying and time-invariant 
variables. The analysis of residuals helps identify the regions of departure and arrival where trade 
flows are consistently under-estimated or over-estimated. 
 
Our second research objective is to examine whether the second-hand trade has led to changes in 
capacity at the regional level and by how much. For a given region, we first assess the model 
reliability by computing of the net number of second-hand vessels arriving in a given region 
through the operation of the market. To do so, we compare the net arrival of second-hand vessels 
(i.e. arrivals less departures) predicted by the gravity model to the net arrival of second-hand 
vessels observed over the whole time-period. We then compare for each region the net arrival of 
second-hand vessels to the net increase in vessel numbers because of constructions/destructions. 
Constructions/destructions are the traditional focus of capacity management policies and most of 
them are subsidised by the government and/or administrative regions. Constructions/destructions 
are therefore used as proxies for capacity management policy impact. We derive consequences of 
capacity redistribution through the second-hand market induced by a shift from national to regional 
policies for capacity management. 
 
This study complements the description of the French Atlantic Ocean depicted in Quillérou and 
Guyader (2012) by focusing on the change of spatial location of vessels within the French Atlantic 
Ocean fleet. This study constitutes a novel application of the gravity model to fishery management 
Quillérou, Roudaut and Guyader 
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data. The econometric model includes the zero trade flows into the estimation of second-hand 
vessel trade in the French Atlantic Ocean. This helps better understand fleet capacity dynamics and 
identify the spatial extent of the second-hand vessel market between districts and other determinants 
of trade. The analysis of residuals helps us identify the spatial distribution of the most unusual trade 
flows (i.e. the furthest from the calculated norm) for zero/non-zero flows and for each region. We 
also identify regions where the second-hand market could limit the effectiveness of regional 
capacity management policies. This study should serve as a basis to improve policy evaluations and 
inform policy design for more effective capacity management. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the economic and econometric models 
used for the estimation of second-hand vessel trade flows between districts. In Section 3, we 
describe the data used. In Section 4, we present the results of the gravity model between districts. 
We also present the net arrivals of second-hand vessels in a given region (predicted and observed) 
and the net increase in vessel numbers because of constructions/destructions. In Section 5, we 
discuss the implications of our findings in relation to our research questions. We conclude in 
Section 6. 
 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Gravity Model: Economic model description 
The gravity model is mostly found in the international trade literature and relates bilateral flows to 
sizes and geographic distance between trading partners. The use of the gravity model has been 
recently rehabilitated by the introduction of multilateral resistance terms solving the omitted bias 
problem (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003, Feenstra 2004, Anderson 2011). We use a demand-side 
structure gravity model as described in Anderson (2011) to analyse the number of second-hand 
vessels (Xij) traded between districts of registration (i and j). Fishing vessels are considered as 
Quillérou, Roudaut and Guyader 
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homogenous goods with heterogeneous characteristics, e.g. age, length, power, tonnage, fleet 
segment. Our study constitutes the first application of the gravity model to second-hand fishing 
vessel markets. 
 
In our context, the demand-side structure gravity model can be specified as follows (Equation 1): 
X ij =
YiYj
Yw
Tij
PiPj
 
 
 
 
 
 
1−σ
  (Equation 1) 
with 
Pj
1−σ = Pi
σ −1
i
∑ θiTij1−σ
Pi
1−σ = Pj
σ −1
j
∑ θ jTij1−σ
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Xij Number of vessels traded from fishing district i (origin) to district j (arrival) 
Yi(j) Size of district i (j) (number of vessels) 
Yw “World size” (Total number of vessels across all districts) 
Tij Barrier-to-trade function between districts i and j  
Pi(j) Implicit equilibrium price index in district i(j) 
σ Elasticity of substitution between vessels of buyers  
θi(j) Relative weight of vessel population of district i (j) (relative to Yw) 
 
District size (Yi(j)) is the total number of vessels registered in the district and reflects the potential 
supply of the exporting district and the potential demand of the importing district: the bigger the 
trading partners the more they trade together. This replaces country population used in international 
trade gravity models. 
 
The barrier-to-trade function (Tij) reflects on the transaction costs between the trading districts (i 
and j). It is traditionally a function of the geographical distance between the trading districts: the 
farther apart the trading partners, the less they trade together. Geographical distance proportional to 
fuel costs, which represent a major part of the transaction costs for traded vessels physically 
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changing districts by sea (Bastardie et al. 2010). The barrier-to-trade function also depends on 
variables reflecting the willingness-to-trade (or not) between the two fishing districts: district 
adjacency, whether the trading districts are within the same administrative region, the fleet structure 
of a given district characterised by total district vessel power, average vessel age, district 
specialisation characterised by the number of different fleet segments, the rate of transactions 
within each of the trading districts to capture market variations (e.g. in vessel profitability), and the 
age of trading vessel owners 3. These variables are specific to the context of second-hand trade of 
fishing vessels. Distance, district adjacency and regional dummies are included to identify the 
average spatial extent of second-hand market transactions (trade flow). The remaining gravity 
model parameters (Pi(j), σ and θi(j) ) are assumed constant for the purposes of this analysis 
4. Finally, 
dummies controlling for the year of trade have also been included (coded by the corresponding 
year) to capture potential time-trends and identify policy changes. 
 
2.2. Gravity Model: Econometric model description 
In our study, trade data are characterised by a high number of zero-values: two fishing districts 
might not trade at all over the study period or some years only. 88.4% of the pairs of districts of 
                                                
3 Greater specialisation of individual trading partners would be expected to lead to greater trade flows between them 
(Haveman and Hummels 2004). Subsidies are mostly offered at the national level, and there is no data available on 
regional or local subsidies. Also, there are no tax differences along the coastline other than landings taxes. There is no 
available data on these landing taxes and fishers can land outside their maritime district of registration. These were thus 
not included into the analysis. Fiscal regulations have been shown to influence investment into fishing capital across 
vessels (Le Floc’h et al. 2011). These regulations are national and apply to all administrative regions. 
4 We tested fish landings as a proxy for implicit equilibrium prices Pi(j) in each district (or "multilateral resistance" for 
trade with other districts) but these were not found to have a significant impact on trade flows between districts. This 
could be due to the available data on landings only representing the fraction of harvest landed in "criées" for auction 
and not including direct sales on fish markets. Landings are also inconsistently recorded over the time period. For these 
reasons of low data quality, we have removed landings from our analysis and have not detailed results in this paper. 
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origin and destination for a given year have a zero trade, 9.5% trade only one vessel across the 
whole time period, and 1.5% trade only two vessels across the whole time period. 
 
This is fairly common in gravity models: two districts may not trade together at a given time 
because of large variable or fixed costs or because trade is imperfectly monitored. Our objective is 
not to test the gravity model econometric specification but rather determine the spatial extent of the 
second-hand market. Our analysis consequently follows the approach taken by Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006) who recommend a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimation. The number 
of transactions Xijt is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution with a conditional mean function of a 
set of independent variables (see Burger et al. 2009 for a detailed presentation of the model). This 
Poisson specification allows to estimate the gravity model in its multiplicative form with trade 
flows entered in levels. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2009) 
showed this econometric model performs well in the presence of heteroskedasticity as well as zero 
trade flows respectively for cross-section and for panel data. 
 
The panel data approach allows to control for unobserved heterogeneity by including district-pair 
effects. The whole population of vessel transactions is available, which usually leads to consider the 
individual effects of the district pairs as fixed (Cameron and Trivedi 1998, Section 9.5, p290-292). 
However, we need to estimate the coefficients of the time-invariant district-pair specific regressors: 
for example, physical distances between districts do not change with time but their impact on trade 
might depending on the macroeconomic context of a given year. The individual effects are 
directional district pair effects treated as random in this study to avoid these being absorbed into the 
district-pair specific (individual) effects. Using a random effect approach potentially avoids the 
problems of omitted variables or neglected heterogeneity but coefficients may be inconsistent if the 
random effects are correlated with the regressors (Cameron and Trivedi 1998, Section 9.5, p290-
292, Wooldridge 2002, p251-252). 
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3. Data and empirical application 
3.1. Gravity Model: Data source, variable construction and descriptive statistics 
The database used for this analysis has been constructed using Microsoft Access 2002 (Microsoft 
Corporation 1992-2001), ArcGIS 9.3.1 (Esri 2009), the Geospatial Modelling Environment add-on 
(Beyer 2001-2010), and R 2.10.1 (R Development Core Team 2009). The econometric analysis has 
been undertaken using Stata 10 (StataCorp 2007). 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
We use a balanced panel data of the 31 French Atlantic Ocean fishing districts (Figure 1) over the 
period 1992-2009 (18 years) available from Ifremer's Fisheries Information System (2010) 
representing the total population of second-hand vessel transactions. This dataset is based on the 
European fleet register with additional primary and secondary data compiled by Ifremer. More 
detailed descriptions of fleets and fleet segment characteristics can be found in Ifremer's "Synthèses 
des flottilles" (Ifremer 2010). The sampling strategy and plan of Ifremer's primary data collection 
are described in Van Iseghem et al. (2011). The hierarchy between the different scales of analysis is 
summed up in Table 1. The observations of second-hand vessel trade flows are spread across 930 
pairs of districts of origin and destination for each year. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Districts of origin and destination are necessarily different as this is a between-district analysis. The 
database includes a dummy for vessels imported from (exported to) other countries but there is no 
information on where from (to). Our study is therefore limited to trade within France. The distance 
for a given pair of district of origin and destination is calculated as the sum of flying distances (in 
km) between the main ports of neighbouring districts and constitutes the best available proxy for the 
Quillérou, Roudaut and Guyader 
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travel distance by sea. For example, the distance beween Dunkerque and Dieppe DK to DP is 
calculated as the flying distance between Dunkerque and Boulogne-sur-Mer (DK to BL)flying added 
to the flying distance between Boulogne-sur-Mer and Dieppe (BL to DP)flying i.e. DK to DP = 
(DK to BL)flying + (BL to DP)flying (Figure 1). Flying distances between the main ports of 
neighbouring districts have been computed from a geographical data layer of fishing district ports 
available at Ifremer (Sextant 2010) using ArcGIS 9.3.1 (Esri 2009) and its Geospatial Modelling 
Environment add-on (Beyer 2001-2010). All variables used are listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Table 3 details the flows for each pairs of districts cumulated over the whole time period (from the 
district of departure as line to the district of arrival as column). 325 out of the 930 pairs of districts 
(34.95%) never trade over the whole time-period. The intensity of flows is higher (darker in Table 
3) for neighbouring districts or districts that are relatively close (along the diagonal), as well as for 
districts on the same sea (Channel or Bay of Biscay). There also seem to be higher trade flows from 
South Bretagne (GV to SN) to North Bretagne and South Normandy (CN to SB), i.e. from the Bay 
of Biscay towards the Channel. This is consistent with Figure 2 showing the number of trade flows 
cumulated over the period decreasing with distance between maritime districts of registration. The 
distribution of zero trade flows is heterogeneous across regions (Table 4). 
 
Table 3 about here 
Figure 2 about here 
Table 4 about here 
 
On average, there are 266 transactions per year, 180 transactions per district (8.6 transactions per 
district per year), 0.145 transactions between two given different districts for a given year 
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(directional flow) and 0.07 transactions within a given district (Figure 2, Table 5). As regions have 
different number of districts, North Bretagne is the most represented region whilst Basse 
Normandie and Nord-Pas de Calais are the least represented regions in the dataset. All descriptive 
statistics are summarised in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
3.2. Vessel constructions and destructions: Dataset 
The number of constructed and destructed vessels is taken from Ifremer's Fisheries Information 
System (2010). The database contains dummies for the types of vessel entry or exit which have 
been used to select the new built ("constructions") or scrapped vessels ("destructions") from the 
whole vessel population. The number of vessels is derived for each region in the Atlantic Ocean by 
counting the unique vessel registration numbers across the whole time-period (1992-2009). This 
time-period starts after the 1991 peak of subsidised vessel destructions in France to avoid 
introducing a bias in our analysis (Guyader et al. 2004). 
 
The net increase in vessel numbers because of constructions/destructions is calculated for each 
region across the 18 years by subtracting the number of vessels leaving the region to be scrapped 
from the number of newly built vessels entering the region. The net increase in vessel numbers 
because of constructions/destructions captures the overall vessel population change in a given 
region resulting from both the arrival of new built vessels (constructions) and the exit of other 
vessels for destruction. 
 
We derive the net arrival of second-hand vessel market trade on each regional fleet from both the 
gravity model predicted trade flows and observed trade flows. We compute the combined impact of 
the second-hand market and policy (constructions/destructions) for each region as the sum of the 
Quillérou, Roudaut and Guyader 
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net arrival of second-hand vessels and the net increase in vessel numbers because of 
constructions/destructions. For comparison purposes, we divide this combined impact (a cumulated 
value over the 1992-2008 time-period) by the fleet size in 2009 for each region. 
 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Gravity Model: Study of coefficients 
 
Table 6 (a,b,c) about here 
 
The traditional gravity model is reported as regression (A) in Table 6. Variables specific to the 
second-hand trade of fishing vessels are introduced in the model and reported as regression (B) in 
Table 6. Most variables are found highly significant with their expected sign. Model (B) is preferred 
following the results of the Likelihood ratio tests and suspicion of a misspecification bias for model 
(A) (Table 6). 
 
As expected, the volume of trade increases with the sizes of both districts of departure and arrival, 
and decreases with geographical distance. Trade is also significantly greater between neighbouring 
districts and for districts within the same administrative region. All regions have significantly more 
arrivals than South Bretagne (except Pays de la Loire and Poitou-Charentes which coefficients are 
not significant). Everything else held constant, there are less departures and more arrivals in 
Aquitaine relative to South Bretagne. The percentage of transactions within the district of departure 
has not been found significant whilst the trade flow significantly increases with the percentage of 
transactions within the district of arrival. Districts of departures trade younger vessels more, and 
districts of arrival trade more with other districts when their average fleet power is smaller and 
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owners younger on average. Compared to 1992, second-hand vessel trade between districts has 
been significantly greater from 1994 to 2009. 
 
4.2. Gravity Model: Study of residuals for zero and non-zero trade flows and for each region 
An analysis of the residuals at the district level reveals that the zero trade flows are slightly 
overestimated because of the nature of the Poisson estimation whilst the non-zero flows are on 
average underestimated. The difference between observed and estimated values is greater for non-
zero flows than for zero flows because of the high number of zero flows in our dataset. Estimated 
non-zero flows are on average 30% less than their observed equivalent. 
 
When aggregated at the regional level, the predicted regional flow is slightly overestimated for the 
more central regions (i.e. Normandie and Bretagne) whilst underestimated for more peripherical 
regions (Nord-Pas de Calais, Pays de la Loire, Poitou-Charentes, Aquitaine). This repartition of the 
residual signs does however not seem to mirror the number of zeros in each region (as shown in 
Table 4). 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
The difference between the estimated and observed net arrivals of second-hand vessels for a given 
region is however small (Table 7). For most regions, the difference is less than 10% of the observed 
value of net arrival of second-hand vessels, except for Nord Bretagne (14%), Haute Normandie 
(22%) and Basse Normandie (30%). This is because the differences between estimates and real-life 
values cancel out in computing the net arrival of second-hand vessels for a given region. 
 
The second-hand market trade decreases fleet size in central regions (South Bretagne, Pays de la 
Loire and Poitou-Charentes) and increases fleet size in peripherical regions, i.e. regions on the 
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Channel (Nord-Pas de Calais, Haute Normandie, Basse Normandie, North Bretagne) and in 
Aquitaine (Table 7). The second-hand market represents on average for each year of the studied 
period between 0.3 and 1.7% of the 2009 fleet size. 
 
4.3. *et arrival of second-hand vessels, net decrease in vessel numbers because of 
constructions/destructions for each region and their combined impact on regional fleets 
All regional fleets have decreased in size because vessels destructions have been greater than 
constructions (Table 7). The magnitude of this reduction in regional fleets varies across regions, 
with a greater decrease in regional fleets of South Bretagne, Pays de la Loire and Aquitaine. 
 
Both the second-hand market and capacity management policies (constructions/destructions) have 
decreased fleet size in central regions (South Bretagne, Pays de la Loire and Poitou-Charentes) as 
detailed in Table 7. However, the second-hand market and capacity management policies 
(constructions/destructions) have opposite impacts on fleet sizes in peripherical regions, i.e. regions 
on the Channel (Nord-Pas de Calais, Haute Normandie, Basse Normandie, North Bretagne) and in 
Aquitaine (Table 7). The combined impact of the second-hand market and the vessel constructions 
and destructions has led to an overall decrease in the vessel numbers in each region, except North 
Bretagne. 
 
The combined impact of the second-hand market redistribution between regions and policy flows 
represents a small proportion of the remaining fleet size in 2009 in Nord-Pas de Calais (7%), Basse 
Normandie (2%), North Bretagne (2%), but about 20% in Haute Normandie and Aquitaine and over 
40% of the fleet size in South Bretagne, Pays de la Loire and Poitou-Charentes (Table 7). Three 
types of regions can be identified: i) regions where the second-hand market and 
constructions/destructions are opposite and cancel one another out with limited overall change in 
regional fleet size (Nord-Pas de Calais, Basse Normandie, North Bretagne), ii) regions where the 
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second-hand market and constructions/destructions are opposite but constructions/destructions are 
greater leading to a decrease in regional fleet size (Haute Normandie and Aquitaine), and iii) 
regions where the second-hand market and constructions/destructions work in synergy and lead to a 
greater decrease in regional fleet size (South Bretagne, Pays de la Loire and Poitou-Charentes). 
 
 
5. Discussion 
5.1. A redistribution of capacity through the second-hand market mainly within regions 
As predicted by the gravity model, trade flows significantly increase with the district populations 
and significantly decrease with distance factors (geographical as well as relative distance). All 
variables related to distance suggest that markets for second-hand vessels between districts are 
geographically (regionally) concentrated and that longer-term capital reallocation between regions 
(fisheries) has so far been spatially limited. This is consistent with the findings of Opaluch et al. 
(1984) on the limited spatial extent of changes between fisheries in the shorter-term. The spatial 
concentration of second-hand vessel market in France would be mainly due to the higher 
availability to the buyers of information on the traded vessel at the local or regional geographical 
level, consistent with the findings of van Putten et al. (2012). 
 
Also, districts with less total fleet power and younger owners attract more second-hand vessels from 
districts with younger (less depreciated) vessels. Small (young) firms are typically limited in their 
investment ability and tend to buy less powerful (cheaper) second-hand vessels rather than new 
(more expensive) vessels to enter into the fishery sector (van Putten et al. 2012). Also, small 
(young) firms receive less subsidies than bigger firms in France and in the European Union 
(Guyader et al. 2007; Cappell et al. 2010). 
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The attractiveness of the district of arrival play a greater role in generating trade flows than that of 
the district of origin as indicated by the percentage of within-district transactions. The district of 
arrival can be more attractive because: i) of higher profitability, or ii) bigger second-hand markets 
attract more potential buyers, or iii) higher demand in the district of arrival for a given vessel type. 
 
Second-hand vessel trade flows between districts seem to be subject to regional differences. Our 
results suggest that vessels tend to leave South Bretagne for other regions. Aquitaine's vessel 
population has increased because of the operation of the second-hand vessel market relative to that 
of South Bretagne. Vessels tend to be reallocated by the second-hand market towards regions 
bordering neighbouring countries (border with Spain in the case of Aquitaine, and borders with the 
United Kingdom and Belgium for the regions on the Channel). 
 
1992 was found to be significantly different from the following years. This could be explained by 
the change in access licences conditions in 1993 (French Decree of January 8, 1993), the significant 
reduction in fleet size in 1991-1992 and the increase in the number of vessel owners over 1992-
1999 (Quillérou et al. 2011; Quillérou and Guyader 2012). The decrease in the number of vessel 
owners from 2000 and the impact of other major policy changes such as the 2002 CFP reform and 
the 2006 implementation round of new French policies with the separation the vessel from its 
quotas track records for second-hand trade cannot be identified in this study as having had an 
impact on second-hand market trade (no detectable pattern in significance level, sign, value for 
1992, 1993-2002, 2003-2006 and 2007-2009). This lack of change in time patterns could be either 
due to an imperfect capture of policy changes through the time dummies (which also capture 
impacts from the wider economy context) or because vessels or because changes in policy merely 
made official already on-going informal (unofficial) business. 
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Gravity models usually are mostly explanatory models with low prediction power. The objective of 
this study was not to test the gravity model itself so we have not formally tested its predictive 
power. Our coefficient estimates could be potentially used to estimate trade flows for the year after 
the end of the time period considered (2009), but results should be taken with caution. 
 
The analysis of residuals suggests that our panel Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood econometric 
model is subject to estimation biases. This is because of the underlying structure of our data (high 
number of zero flows) as discussed by Burger et al. (2009). This suggests that estimates of 
individual trade flows should be taken with caution especially for non-zero trade flows. At the 
regional level, because we have not found any obvious relationship between regional biases and the 
number of zero trade flows per region suggests that these regional biases are mainly due to the 
biases arising with the individual non-zero flows rather than a varying number of zero flows per 
region. 
 
The gravity model does not directly allow to estimate the net impact of second-hand trade on 
regional fleet capacity (size). The second-hand market may be regionally concentrated on average 
but its net impact on regional fleets may be significant in some regions. The gravity model provides 
a valid estimate of net arrivals of second-hand vessels and could be used to estimate the net arrival 
of second-hand vessels in a given region for ex ante assessment of a change in capacity 
management policy scale. 
 
5.2. A second-hand market increasing regional fleet capacity and undermining capacity 
reduction policy target achievement on the Channel and Aquitaine (peripherical regions) 
The results from the estimation of individual trade flows suggest that the second-hand market 
should not impair the achievement of regionally set targets. Markets have been found 
geographically concentrated between neighbouring districts or within the same region. This is 
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assuming that a shift from a national policy to regional policies will not change the operation of the 
second-hand market and its spatial extent. 
 
However, a closer look at the net impact of the second-hand market at the regional level, 
constructions and destructions at the regional level suggests that this average relationship does not 
hold for each region. The between regions redistribution, although low, is not zero and has a net 
impact on regional fleet capacity (size). At the regional level, the operation of the second-hand 
market would increase the regional policy effectiveness (reduction in regional capacity) in central 
regions (South Bretagne, Pays de la Loire and Poitou-Charentes), but decrease policy effectiveness 
in peripherical regions (Aquitaine and the Channel regions) and cancel out policy impacts in North 
Bretagne. 
 
5.3. Consequences for design of regional capacity management policies 
For at least three regions (Nord-Pas de Calais, Basse Normandie, North Bretagne), the impact of the 
second-hand market cannot be ignored if capacity is to be effectively reduced in each region. 
Assuming that regional and local government did want to reduce local capacity through the co-
financing of decommissioning plans in the past, second-hand vessel market redistribution has 
clearly undermined this objective in these regions. 
 
One way to ensure regional policy effectiveness would be to limit second-hand market trade 
between regions. This would however impair the efficient reallocation of capacity through a change 
of owner to more profitable fisheries or reduce transparency of capacity reallocation to the 
regulator. This type of regulation would impose an extra cost on society for monitoring and 
enforcement. Capacity policies are also subject to information problems because of asymmetric 
information and capacity heterogeneity (Curtis and Squires 2004; Guyader et al. 2004; Clark et al. 
2005; Pascoe et al. 2012). In theory, moving to more targeted policies at the regional level could 
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decrease information problems by targeting more homogeneous fleet segments. This is however not 
likely to be the case in France because fleet segments are heterogeneous (as indicated by the Index 
of Variability detailed in Van Iseghem et al. 2011). Also, regulating second-hand market trade 
between regions would not prevent one fisher from fishing in more profitable areas nor give fishers 
increased incentives to reduce actually used fishing capacity rather than total capacity. 
 
Rather than regulate second-hand market trade, limiting entry to specific fishery through 
implementation of fishery access licences might effectively limit trade between regions. This shift 
would be consistent with the policy scale of decommissioning policies and targeting of fisheries and 
related fish stocks (European Commission 2008, Commission of the European Communities 2009). 
Current fish stock management effectiveness is currently impaired for cross-country stocks (e.g. in 
the Channel) because policies are implemented within Member States but not between Member 
States. This approach would need to be applied for a given fishery for all concerned Member States 
to be fully effective. 
 
Alternative policy instruments for capacity management could be altogether adopted to manage 
fishing capacity more effectively and fish stocks more sustainably. The French government is 
currently examining various policy options to prepare for the 2013 reform of the CFP. The current 
discussions at the European Union level suggests decommissioning plans would be discontinued 
and market-based instruments such as Individual Tradable Quotas and Individual Transferable 
Effort would be adopted for more effective reduction in overfishing and overcapacity (Commission 
of the European Communities 2009, European Commission 2011). Individual Trade Quotas (ITQs) 
realign incentives to fishermen for more economically efficient fish harvest whilst Individual 
Transferable Effort (ITE) realigns incentive for more economically efficient capacity management 
(Anderson 1989). 
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ITQs are instruments that directly reduce overfishing and provide indirect incentives to fishers for 
more efficient use of capacity (Asche et al. 2008; Squires et al. 2010). ITQs are not affected as such 
by second-hand trade between regions but would naturally restrict second-hand trade between 
regions in France if linked to specific fish stocks. For instance, fishing vessels need specific scallop 
fishing licences to harvest in the Bay of St Brieuc in North Brittany The majority of these vessels 
are traded between fishers already in the fishery. The scallop fishing licence, because it is 
geographically limited, acts as a natural barrier to second-hand trade between regions. The 
introduction of ITQs could reduce the cost of capacity management regulation to the French 
government compared to regional capacity management policies.  
 
Some fish stocks are already currently subject to national quotas determined at the European Union 
level for each Member State. These national fishing quotas are allocated by the French government 
to producer organisations who in turn allocate them between individual vessels (MRAG et al. 2009, 
Part 2 Section 10, p106-133). These quotas can be traded within and between producer 
organisations. There is no uniform way to allocate these quotas across fisheries and related fish 
stocks, across producer organisations and across fishing vessels, and not all fish stocks are subject 
to fishing quotas. Trade of these quotas between fishing vessels is officially forbidden by law in 
France. 
 
ITEs are instruments that directly reduce overcapacity thereby indirectly contributing to overfishing 
reduction and more sustainable harvests. This form of policy instrument has been adopted in the 
Tasmanian rock lobster fishery in Australia with capacity (pot traps) being sold or leased out 
between fishers (van Putten et al. 2011). The adoption of ITEs under a fixed quota allowance 
system led to a reduction in the number of active fishers and number of vessel days (effort) required 
to fish the allowed catch. The reduction in number of vessel days could in turn lead to a reduction in 
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fleet capacity although this is not detailed specifically in this study of the Tasmanian rock lobster 
fishery. 
 
Our results suggest that the change currently considered by the French government from command-
and-control capacity management policies at the regional level towards market-based instruments 
could be appropriate for more effective fishing stock and capacity management. Although appealing 
in theory, these instruments are however not always perfect in real-life. Clark et al. (2007) indeed 
showed that substituting ITQ schemes for limited-entry programs does not eliminate fully strategic 
behaviours of fishers. Effectiveness of these incentive instruments has been shown to depend on the 
current status and the dynamics of the stock, the broader context, transaction costs of 
implementation, time horizon, scale, the degree of uncertainty, the degree of heterogeneity of 
fishery users, initial allocation across stakeholders, and can be reduced when leasing is allowed 
(Whitmarsh 1998; Asche et al. 2008; Arnason 2009; Pinkerton and Edwards 2009; Townsend 2010; 
Holland and Herrera 2012; Péreau et al. 2012). All these parameters need to be considered for 
policy instrument design for effective capacity reduction and sustainable management of fisheries 
and related fish stocks. A further investigation is needed to assess whether ITQs would be sufficient 
to decrease capacity effectively or if complementary ITEs would be required. Consequences for 
economic efficiency would also need to be assessed between adoption of ITQs and adoption of both 
ITQs and ITEs. 
 
Ideally, these market-based instruments should be implemented at the European level for increased 
management effectiveness. Current political discussions however suggest that fishing harvests and 
capacity would still be managed separately in each Member State. Tradable permits for both fishing 
harvests and capacity (ITQs and ITEs) would be implemented alongside one another in each 
Member State (European Commission 2011). The risk with adoption of these parallel instruments is 
that it keeps the overcapacity and overfishing goals separate and does not operationalise a hierarchy 
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between these goals. It is not clear that the new instruments will lead to an improvement on this 
aspect compared to the current system. The shift to these new instruments also raises concerns on 
how to ensure a fair initial quota allocation between vessels and/or owners, the impact of these 
tradable permits on industry concentration, the respective role of government and producer 
organisations in the permit market regulation, and which trading rules should be adopted (Anderson 
2008, Flaaten 2010). Both ITQs and ITEs would require public funding for set up and monitoring of 
the transfer market. However, following recent concerns on market distortions induced by 
speculation, Member States may be allowed to regulate transfer market to prevent these distorsions. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study aimed to assess whether the capacity redistribution along the French coastline by the 
second-hand fishing vessels market could undermine the effectiveness of capacity management 
policies implemented at the regional level, and by how much. We have modelled trade flows 
between fishing districts using a gravity model and a panel Poisson econometric model. Our results 
show that individual trade flows are indeed determined by spatial distances between trading 
partners and that second-hand markets tend to be geographically concentrated. Second-hand vessels 
tend to be reallocated from the central towards the peripherical regions. The national decrease in 
vessel numbers has been asymmetric between regions because of regional differences in both 
constructions/destructions and second-hand vessel net arrivals. Our results suggest that the change 
currently considered by the French from command-and-control capacity management policies at the 
regional level towards market-based instruments could be appropriate for more effective fishing 
stock and capacity management. 
 
The gravity model has been designed to identify what determines trade flows relative to a norm 
(average flow) and does not lend itself to predictions, or at best to one-year predictions assuming 
Quillérou, Roudaut and Guyader 
Managing fleet capacity effectively under second-hand market redistribution 
 27 
the same trading context. This paper did not aim to assess the prediction power of our model and we 
have therefore not explored this aspect. 
 
Future research in relation to this study would require the design of a new econometric specification 
to reduce the overestimation of the zero trade flows (e.g. a panel zero-inflated model or panel 
negative binomial model in line with Burger et al. 2009). A dynamic panel could also be tried as an 
alternative to the random-effect model. The distance to consumer markets of the district of origin 
(arrival) could also be included into the model: a higher (smaller) distance to consumer markets 
could indeed increase the flow to (from) other districts (Head and Mayer 2011). A simple proxy 
was however not available for this study and would need to be custom-designed beforehand. 
Statistics on vessels characteristics that could influence trade (e.g. age, length, power, tonnage, 
number of different fleet segments) could also be included for each district of origin and of arrival 
to characterise the degree of structural differences (specialisation) between the trading districts. 
 
Because a reduction in vessel numbers does not necessarily mean a reduction in capacity, it would 
be interesting to contrast results obtained from vessel numbers to other measures of capacity. It was 
however possible to use neither tonnage nor fishing power in this analysis because of incomparable 
measurement units and record inaccuracies over the time period considered. 
 
It would be interesting to compare these results to the status of fishing stocks for each French 
region. There is so far no published research on the status of stocks in France, let alone each French 
region. Details on specific stocks can be found in Biseau et al. (2011). The status of the stock(s) for 
each region would need extensive research as it encompasses several fished species, fleet segments, 
districts of registration (fishing areas) and stocks are distributed across several European Member 
States. The results of such a study could then be compared to the results described in this paper. 
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This model could also be estimated on different time-periods and different measures of physical 
distance between districts to further test the robustness of our results, or for other countries. This is 
constrained by the number of non-zero observations available. 
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Figure 1: French Maritime Districts of Registration (main district ports), data source: Sextant Ifremer (2010). 
(DK: Dunkerque; BL: Boulogne-sur-Mer; DP: Dieppe; FC: Fécamp; LH: Le Havre; C;: Caen; CH: Cherbourg; SM: 
Saint-Malo; SB: Saint-Brieuc; PL: Paimpol; MX: Morlaix; BR: Brest; CM: Camaret; DZ: Douarnenez; AD: 
Audierne; GV: Guilvinec; CC: Concarneau; LO: Lorient; AY: Auray; VA: Vannes; S;: Saint-Nazaire; ;A: Nantes; 
;O: Noirmoutier; YE: L'Ile-d'Yeu; LS: Les Sables-d'Olonne; LR: La Rochelle; IO: Ile d'Oléron; M;: Marennes; BX: 
Bordeaux; AC: Arcachon; BA: Bayonne; PV: Port-Vendres; ST: Sète; MT: Martigues; MA: Marseille; TL: Toulon; 
;I: Nice; BI: Bastia; AJ: Ajaccio). 
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Figure 2: Trade flows cumulated over the time period (vessel numbers) as a function of distance between trading 
partners (km) 
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Table 1: Geographical level hierarchy 
Country Ocean "Façade" Regions Districts of registration 
(several ports) 
France Atlantic Channel Nord-Pas-de-Calais DK BL 
   Haute-Normandie DP FC LH RO 
   Basse-Normandie CN CH 
   North Bretagne SM SB PL MX BR CM 
  Bay of Biscay South Bretagne DZ AD GV CC LO AY VA 
    Pays de la Loire SN NA NO YE LS 
   Poitou-Charentes LR MN IO 
   Aquitaine BX AC BA 
 Mediterranean Mediterranean Languedoc-Roussillon PV ST MT 
   Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur 
MA TL NI 
(DK: Dunkerque; BL: Boulogne-sur-Mer; DP: Dieppe; FC: Fécamp; LH: Le Havre; C;: Caen; CH: Cherbourg; SM: 
Saint-Malo; SB: Saint-Brieuc; PL: Paimpol; MX: Morlaix; BR: Brest; CM: Camaret; DZ: Douarnenez; AD: Audierne; 
GV: Guilvinec; CC: Concarneau; LO: Lorient; AY: Auray; VA: Vannes; S;: Saint-Nazaire; ;A: Nantes; ;O: 
Noirmoutier; YE: L'Ile-d'Yeu; LS: Les Sables-d'Olonne; LR: La Rochelle; IO: Ile d'Oléron; M;: Marennes; BX: 
Bordeaux; AC: Arcachon; BA: Bayonne; PV: Port-Vendres; ST: Sète; MT: Martigues; MA: Marseille; TL: Toulon; 
;I: Nice; BI: Bastia; AJ: Ajaccio). The Bay of Biscay is coded as "Façade Atlantique" in Ifremer's Fisheries 
Information System. 
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Table 2: Definition of variables 
Variable Description Source 
Dep District of origin, i.e. the place where the vessel is registered 
at the end of a given year (December 31st of year t-1) 
Direction des 
Pêches Maritimes et 
Aquaculture 
(DPMA), Fisheries 
Information System 
(Ifremer 2010) 
Arr District of arrival i.e. the place where the vessel is registered 
after the transaction (December 31st of year t) 
t Year of transaction 
TradeFlow Number of vessels (unique registration numbers) changing 
owners and district in year t for a given pair of Dep-Arr 
districts 
Direction des 
Pêches Maritimes et 
Aquaculture 
(DPMA), Fisheries 
Information System 
(Ifremer 2010) 
PopDep Number of vessels (unique registration numbers) for a given 
district of origin Dep at t-1 
PopArr Number of vessels (unique registration numbers) for a given 
district of arrival Arr at t-1 
Distance Distance between the district of origin Dep and of arrival 
Arr along the coastline (km) 
- Sextant (2010) 
- ArcGIS 9.3.1 (Esri 
2009) 
- Geospatial 
Modelling 
Environment (Beyer 
2001-2010) 
NeighbourDistricts Dummy equal to 1 if the districts of origin Dep and of 
arrival Arr are neighbours (i.e. with a shared "border"), 0 
otherwise. Each of these districts has two neighbours with 
the exception of inland ports such as Nantes or Bordeaux 
and their immediate neighbours (Saint-Nazaire and 
Noirmoutier, Marennes and Arcachon) which have three 
neighbours each (Figure 1). 
 
SameRegion Dummy equal to 1 if the districts of origin Dep and of 
arrival Arr are within the same administrative region, 0 
otherwise 
 
Nb_Fleet_Dep 
(Nb_Fleet_Arr) 
Number of different fleet segments in the district of 
Departure Dep (of arrival Arr) 
Direction des 
Pêches Maritimes et 
Aquaculture 
(DPMA), Fisheries 
Information System 
(Ifremer 2010) 
Power_Dep 
(Power_Arr) 
Total fleet power in the district of departure Dep (of arrival 
Arr) *10-5 
Age_Vessel_Dep 
(Age_Vessel_Arr) 
Average vessel age in the district of departure Dep (of 
arrival Arr) 
Age_Owner_Dep 
(Age_Owner_Arr) 
Average age of owners in the district of departure Dep (of 
arrival Arr) 
%TransactionsIntra_Dep 
(%TransactionsIntra_Arr) 
Number of transactions within the district of origin Dep (of 
arrival Arr) for the year of transaction t divided by the total 
number of transactions on the Atlantic Ocean coast 
cumulated across all years 
1993 to 2009 Time dummies, equal to 1 for the corresponding year of 
transaction, 0 otherwise (reference: 1992) 
 
RGDep_ Dummies coding for the region of origin (Dep). 
e.g. RGDep_Aquitaine equals to 1 if the vessel leaves from 
a district in Aquitaine, 0 otherwise (reference: South 
Bretagne) 
 
RGArr_ Dummies coding for the region of arrival (Arr). 
e.g. RGArr_Aquitaine equals to 1 if the vessel arrives in a 
district in Aquitaine, 0 otherwise (reference: South 
Bretagne) 
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Table 3: Trade flows from district of Origin (Dep, table lines) to the district of Arrival (Arr, table columns) cumulated over the whole time period 
5
 
Dep/Arr DK BL DP FC LH C; CH SM SB PL MX BR CM DZ AD GV CC LO AY VA S; ;A ;O YE LS LR IO M; BX AC BA Total 
DK   6 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 
BL 7   8 3 3 7 3 3 11 1 3 1 0 0 1 4 1 2 2 1 4 0 0 1 3 2 0 0 0 2 4 77 
DP 1 7   6 1 5 5 2 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 40 
FC 0 1 6   1 2 7 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 27 
LH 0 2 3 3   5 1 3 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 
C; 1 10 10 5 8   21 5 16 3 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 6 1 3 0 4 0 3 2 0 4 1 2 3 116 
CH 1 6 9 1 1 26   13 17 11 10 8 1 3 1 9 2 0 7 4 11 0 6 1 7 3 0 3 2 1 4 168 
SM 2 4 4 0 2 12 20   20 4 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 89 
SB 0 4 1 0 2 9 13 12   20 5 9 1 0 0 6 3 2 9 1 7 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 112 
PL 0 3 1 0 2 4 10 5 20   2 11 2 1 0 3 0 1 4 4 3 0 1 0 3 1 2 3 0 1 1 88 
MX 0 1 2 1 0 2 6 1 6 9   23 2 0 1 1 0 2 8 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 72 
BR 0 4 0 0 1 1 5 2 9 13 17   2 3 5 8 4 1 8 4 5 0 3 1 3 0 2 2 0 0 0 103 
CM 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 2 1 4   0 1 2 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 20 
DZ 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 0   0 11 4 4 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 41 
AD 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 3 3 0 4   5 2 5 4 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 41 
GV 1 9 4 0 0 10 10 3 8 3 13 7 2 4 1   23 8 8 1 8 1 0 1 11 3 0 3 0 1 9 152 
CC 0 3 0 1 0 7 5 0 8 3 4 5 0 4 3 26   12 8 1 6 0 1 2 8 2 2 1 0 0 15 127 
LO 0 2 2 1 1 4 11 1 5 2 2 5 0 1 3 12 9   12 4 15 0 0 1 5 2 0 0 0 3 15 118 
AY 0 0 1 0 1 10 10 9 7 3 6 3 0 0 1 10 2 12   4 5 1 3 0 8 0 1 4 1 3 1 106 
VA 1 0 0 0 0 3 7 0 0 5 1 4 0 1 1 0 1 7 15   8 2 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 64 
S; 0 5 4 0 1 8 12 8 6 5 3 2 0 0 1 7 1 5 18 13   4 8 3 13 5 1 4 0 2 7 146 
;A 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 16   2 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 34 
;O 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 2 1 3 0 3 1 0 1 0 1 6 2 5 11 4   3 13 4 1 3 1 0 5 76 
YE 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 5 1 4 1 1 1 0 6   1 0 0 0 0 1 3 34 
LS 1 9 4 5 1 5 5 1 14 2 3 2 1 1 2 7 3 8 6 4 10 6 14 3   12 6 12 2 4 10 163 
LR 0 1 1 0 0 2 7 2 2 5 1 1 1 0 1 8 4 3 1 2 3 2 4 0 20   4 15 1 2 5 98 
IO 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 3 0 2 0 1 3 1 4 0 2 1   34 1 0 1 65 
M; 0 5 1 0 1 2 5 2 6 4 0 3 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 2 15 16 7   11 8 3 103 
BX 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 12   6 3 28 
AC 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 1 2 0   5 22 
BA 0 2 1 1 0 4 1 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 7 5 2 3 2 18   58 
Total 20 85 68 27 27 133 181 81 172 103 86 107 16 24 27 140 67 93 128 59 132 23 67 19 144 67 34 110 24 55 108 2427 
                                                
5
 DK: Dunkerque; BL: Boulogne-sur-Mer; DP: Dieppe; FC: Fécamp; LH: Le Havre; C;: Caen; CH: Cherbourg; SM: Saint-Malo; SB: Saint-Brieuc; PL: Paimpol; MX: Morlaix; BR: Brest; CM: Camaret; DZ: Douarnenez; AD: Audierne; GV: Guilvinec; 
CC: Concarneau; LO: Lorient; AY: Auray; VA: Vannes; S;: Saint-Nazaire; ;A: Nantes; ;O: Noirmoutier; YE: L'Ile-d'Yeu; LS: Les Sables-d'Olonne; LR: La Rochelle; IO: Ile d'Oléron; M;: Marennes; BX: Bordeaux; AC: Arcachon; BA: Bayonne 
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Table 4: ;umber of zero flows for each region of departure and arrival 
Region 
;umber of zero flows 
across all years for each 
region of departure 
(% total) 
;umber of zero flows across all 
years for each region of arrival 
 (% total) 
C
H
A
N
N
E
L
 
Nord-Pas de Calais 999 (7%) 992 (7%) 
Haute Normandie 1536 (10%) 1511 (10%) 
Basse Normandie 862 (6%) 837 (6%) 
Bretagne 
North 2847 (19%) 2777 (19%) 
A
L
T
A
N
T
IC
 
South 3270 (22%) 3348 (23%) 
Pays de la Loire 2330 (16%) 2392 (16%) 
Poitou-Charentes 1421 (10%) 1468 (10%) 
Aquitaine 1528 (10%) 1468 (10%) 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics (sample of 16740 observations) 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
TradeFlow 0.145 0.450 0 7 
PopDep 
(PopArr) 
136.4 90 14 468 
Distance 459.2 321.3 14 1477 
NeighbourDistricts 0.034 0.182 0 1 
SameRegion 0.213 0.409 0 1 
Nb_Fleet_Dep 
Nb_Fleet_Arr 
6.242 5.042 1 15 
Power_Dep 
Power_Arr 
0.260 0.251 0.012 1.460 
Age_Vessel_Dep 
Age_Vessel_Arr 
19.108 3.790 6.554 30.516 
Age_Owner_Dep 
Age_Owner_Arr 
41.863 2.358 35.009 48.404 
%TransactionsIntra_Dep 
(%TransactionsIntra_Arr) 
.067 .063 0 .388 
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Table 6: Poisson estimation of second-hand vessel trade flows between districts 
(a) 
 (A) (B) 
log(PopDep) 0.950 0.847 
 (16.64)*** (9.61)*** 
log(PopArr) 1.010 1.010 
 (17.19)*** (11.21)*** 
log(Distance) -0.658 -0.659 
 (14.15)*** (14.45)*** 
NeighbourDistricts 0.383 0.379 
 (2.86)*** (2.91)*** 
SameRegion 0.185 0.182 
 (1.86)* (1.87)* 
Nb_Fleet_Dep  0.013 
  (0.63) 
Nb_Fleet_Arr  0.025 
  (1.24) 
Power_Dep  0.000 
  (0.95) 
Power_Arr  -0.000 
  (2.64)*** 
Age_Vessel_Dep  -0.039 
  (2.90)*** 
Age_Vessel_Arr  -0.016 
  (1.18) 
Age_Owner_Dep  0.007 
  (0.36) 
Age_Owner_Arr  -0.041 
  (2.17)** 
%TransactionsIntra_Dep  0.340 
  (0.74) 
%TransactionsIntra_Arr  1.345 
  (2.98)*** 
Constant -9.069 -6.719 
 (17.43)*** (5.06)*** 
Log Likelihood -6019.02 -6004.19 
LR test (chi2) A versus B  29.68*** 
Observations 16740 16740 
(* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
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(b) 
 (A) (B) 
RGDep_NordPasDeCalais 0.134 0.069 
 (0.85) (0.42) 
RGDep_HauteNormandie 0.287 0.265 
 (1.80)* (1.65) 
RGDep_BasseNormandie 0.182 0.156 
 (1.44) (1.11) 
RGDep_NordBretagne 0.137 0.214 
 (1.48) (2.07)** 
RGDep_PaysLoire 0.191 0.238 
 (2.03)** (2.24)** 
RGDep_PoitouCharentes 0.345 0.455 
 (3.06)*** (3.70)*** 
RGDep_Aquitaine -0.355 -0.329 
 (2.59)*** (2.17)** 
RGArr_NordPasDeCalais 0.636 0.610 
 (4.10)*** (3.81)*** 
RGArr_HauteNormandie 0.945 0.895 
 (6.20)*** (5.81)*** 
RGArr_BasseNormandie 0.599 0.448 
 (4.73)*** (3.22)*** 
RGArr_NordBretagne 0.621 0.537 
 (6.65)*** (5.19)*** 
RGArr_PaysLoire 0.177 -0.016 
 (1.75)* (0.01) 
RGArr_PoitouCharentes 0.306 0.194 
 (2.51)** (1.48) 
RGArr_Aquitaine 0.519 0.469 
 (4.26)*** (3.46)*** 
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(c) 
 (A) (B) 
1993 -0.134 0.075 
 (0.97) (0.53) 
1994 0.310 0.609 
 (2.47)** (4.70)*** 
1995 0.129 0.434 
 (0.97) (3.12)*** 
1996 0.616 0.902 
 (5.08)*** (6.74)*** 
1997 0.671 0.670 
 (5.57)*** (2.02)** 
1998 0.846 1.265 
 (7.15)*** (9.12)*** 
1999 0.748 1.223 
 (6.11)*** (8.35)*** 
2000 0.797 1.314 
 (6.53)*** (8.46)*** 
2001 0.869 1.033 
 (7.17)*** (3.01)*** 
2002 0.757 0.937 
 (6.02)*** (2.66)*** 
2003 0.545 0.792 
 (4.11)*** (2.21)** 
2004 0.766 1.022 
 (6.04)*** (2.87)*** 
2005 0.769 1.041 
 (5.89)*** (2.86)*** 
2006 0.468 0.774 
 (3.31)*** (2.10)** 
2007 0.792 1.090 
 (6.01)*** (3.02)*** 
2008 0.646 1.099 
 (4.71)*** (3.06)*** 
2009 0.645 1.077 
 (4.57)*** (2.90)*** 
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Table 7: For each region, predicted and observed arrivals and departures of second-hand vessels, net increase in vessel numbers because of constructions/destructions and 
combined impact of second-hand market and constructions/destructions 
Region 
;et arrival of second-hand vessels 
(Arrivals minus Departures) 
;et increase in vessel 
numbers because of 
constructions 
/destructions 
(Constructions 
minus Destructions) 
Combined impact 
(%2009 fleet size, 
absolute value) 
Predicted 
by the gravity model 
Observed 
Difference 
(%Observed) 
C
H
A
N
N
E
L
 
Nord-Pas de Calais 106 -   90 = 16 105 -   88 = 17 1 (6%) 52 -   82 = -30 -13 (7%) 
Haute Normandie 119 -   98 = 21 122 -   95 = 27 6 (23%) 18 -   73 = -55 -28 (21%) 
Basse Normandie 344 - 305 = 39 314 - 284 = 30 -9 (-30%) 175 - 212 = -37 -7 (2%) 
Bretagne 
North 568 - 476 = 92 565 - 484 = 81 -11 (-14%) 134 - 205 = -71 10 (2%) 
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South 567 - 688 = -121 539 - 649 = -110 11 (-10%) 169 - 388 = -219 -329 (42%) 
Pays de la Loire 384 - 452 = -68 385 - 454 = -69 -1 (2%) 125 - 361 = -236 -305 (65%) 
Poitou-Charentes 200 - 253 = -53 212 - 266 = -54 -1 (2%) 31 - 112 = -81 -135 (53%) 
Aquitaine 175 - 102 = 73 187 - 109 = 78 5 (7%) 105 - 237 = -132 -54 (18%) 
 
